

## Tárgytematika

### Price and Market Theory

NGM\_AK108\_1

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**Beszámolási forma:** Vizsga

**Tárgy heti óraszám:** 4/0/0

**Tárgy féléves óraszám:** 0/0/0

### OKTATÁS CÉLJA

Az ár - és piacelmélet a modern közgazdaságtan egyik, talán legdinamikusabban fejlődő területe. A tárgy célja azon analitikus gondolkodásmód és elemzési eszköztár alapjainak lerakása, mely a valóságos üzleti élet jelenségeit kívánja kezelni, összekötő kapcsot képezve az elméleti mikroökonómia és az üzleti tudományok között.

### TANTÁRGY TARTALMA

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<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; " roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?;?serif?;=""&gt;1&lt;span style="font-family:; " roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?;? serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>	<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; " roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?;?serif?;=""&gt;Introduction and Theoretical Background I. – Aim and methodology if Price Theory. Competition Policy: History, Objectives, and the Law; &lt;span style="font-family:; " roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?;?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>
<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; " roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?;?serif?;=""&gt;2&lt;span style="font-family:; " roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?;? serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>	<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; " roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?;?serif?;=""&gt;Introduction and Theoretical Background II.– Pure market structures: monopoly monopsony, perfect competition, perfect duopoly, measuring market structure and market power, concentration and profitability&lt;span style="font-family:; " roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?;? serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>

<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;3&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>	<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;Non-perfect Models: &lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt; &lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;- cost functions of multiproduct companies,&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt; &lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;- dominant firm-competitive fringe model;&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt; &lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;- introduction to price discrimination;&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>
<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;4.&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>	<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;Price Discrimination and Monopoly: &lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt; &lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;- linear pricing: third degree price discrimination or group pricing;&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt; &lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;- non-linear pricing: first and second degree price discrimination &lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt; &lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;- social welfare and price discrimination&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>
<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;5.&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>	<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;Commodity Bundling and Tie-in Sales&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt; &lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;- Stiegler model&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt; &lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;- Adams and Yellen model&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>

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<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;7.&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,? serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>	<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;Bertrand in a Spatial Setting&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt; &lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;Stackelberg in a Spatial Setting – sequential price competition&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>
<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;8.&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,? serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>	<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt; Anticompetitive Strategies I. – Capacity expansion as a credible entry-detering commitment /Dixit-model/&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>
<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;9.&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,? serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>	<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt; Anticompetitive Strategies II. –Predation and imperfect information /Bolton-Scharfstein modell, Milgrom-Roberts modell/ &lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>
<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;10.&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,? serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>	<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt; Anticompetitive Strategies III. – Predation and long-term exclusive contracts /Aghion-Bolton, Rasmussen-Rasmayer-Wiley/ &lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>

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<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;12&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,? serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>	<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;Advertising and Competition I. – The monopoly firm’s profit-maximizing level of advertising&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,? serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>
<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;13&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,? serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>	<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;Advertising and Competition II. – Advertising and information in product-differentiated markets&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,? serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>
<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;14&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,? serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>	<p>&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" 9pt;="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;=""&gt;Advertising and Competition III. – Advertising, brand name, competition&lt;span style="font-family:; roman?;="" new="" ?times="" times="" hu?="" roman?,?serif?;="" 12pt;=""&gt;</p>

## SZÁMONKÉRÉSI ÉS ÉRTÉKELÉSI RENDSZERE

Szóbeli vizsga.

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